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In recent years, Democrat and Republican elites have grown increasingly distinct on the matter of
religion, with Republican candidates embracing more religious language and Democratic candidates
increasingly sidestepping religion in favor of increasingly secular and non-religious rhetoric. Despite
this trend, however, a large number of Democratic voters still identify as religious. This poses
a challenge for Democratic candidates who must seek to court the funds and approval of secular
Democratic activists and voters without alienating religious voters and risking their chances of
reelection. This study uses a survey experiment to determine how voters respond to three different
types of candidate messaging: religious, moral, and economic. I find that religious respondents
of both parties evaluate candidates who use religious messaging more favorably than nonreligious
respondents. However, all respondents, regardless of party or level of church attendance, preferred
candidates who used moral messaging, or messaging that frames key issues as a matter of fundamental
right or wrong in a way that is distinctly not religious. Therefore, I conclude that moral messaging
might be a key strategy to help candidates appeal to a middle ground between their religious and
non-religious voters and activists.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the many people who provided input and thoughts on my thesis. In
particular, I would like to thank Sarah Treul Roberts and Tim Ryan for their invaluable advice as I
developed this project and for their guidance and support throughout this process. Additionally,
I would like to thank Marc Hetherington for his helpful questions and criticism. Finally, to Tim
McDonald, thank you for always being my sounding board and my biggest supporter.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF FIGURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A DEMOCRATIC DIVISION: THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS NONES AND SECULAR
PARTY ACTIVISTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PARTY DISTINCTIVENESS AND COMPETITIVE MAJORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
RELIGIOUS VERSUS MORAL LANGUAGE: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
HYPOTHESES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Devotion to God and Country: Republicans and Religious Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Good without God: Democrats, Morality and Campaign Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Good without Government: Public Secularism and Campaign Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
DATA AND METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Treatment Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The Role of Church Attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Public Secularism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Moral and Religious Conviction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Manipulation Check Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
iv
Question Wording . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Full Models From Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Models for Enthusiasm for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Models for Trust In Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
v
LIST OF TABLES
1 Candidate Statements by Treatment Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2 Treatment Effect on Affect for Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3 The Effect of Public Secularism on Affect for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4 Effect of Moral and Religious Conviction on Affect for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 Effect of Church Attendance on Affect for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6 Treatment Effect on Enthusiasm for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7 Effect of Church Attendance on Enthusiasm for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8 The Effect of Public Secularism on Enthusiasm for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9 Effect of Religious and Moral Conviction on Enthusiasm for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
10 Treatment Effect on Trust for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
11 Effect of Church Attendance on Trust for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
12 Effect of Public Secularism on Trust for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
13 Effect of Religious and Moral Conviction on Trust for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Treatment Effect on Affect for Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
vii
INTRODUCTION
Upon the adoption of the 2012 Democratic platform at the Democratic National Convention,
Republicans began to criticize the party for removing God from the document. While the Republican
party platform mentioned God 12 times, the Democratic party had decided that even one reference
was unacceptable. In response, the Democrats brought a motion to the floor to amend the platform
and restore the language to that used in the 2008 platform, which references giving “everyone
willing to work hard the chance to make the most of their God-given potential.” Though the motion
eventually passed on the third round of voting, there was a great deal of confusion throughout
the voice vote with “ays” and “nays” ringing through the arena with equal volume (Tapper and
Bingham, 2012). The loud boos that followed this decision serve as a clear indicator of a divide
within the Democratic Party.
This disruption during the 2012 Democratic National Convention clearly demonstrates growing
divides both between Democrats and Republicans and within the Democratic party on the matter
of religion. In response to these divides, Republican elites are embracing more religious language to
court religious voters and Democratic elites are increasingly sidestepping religion all together to
appease their increasing secular and non-religious populations (Campbell et al., 2018; D’Antonio
et al., 2013; Layman and Weaver, 2016). At the surface, this elite-level divide seems to indicate
that party elites believe that they must cater to the religiosity of their voters, giving credence to
the idea that mass level partisans determine their party affiliation by aligning their religious beliefs
and identities with the party’s position on religion (Layman, 2001). These elite level practices
align with much of the early literature on religion and politics, which argues that religion, like
partisan identification and other social identities, is an “unmoved mover” (Campbell et al., 1960;
Johnston, 2006; Miller et al., 1996), a stable identity that influences and moves political attitudes
while remaining constant itself. However, a recent body of literature has shown that an individual’s
partisanship may impact her religious beliefs and behavior, with Republicans becoming more religious
and Democrats becoming less religious as traditionalist organized religion becomes increasingly
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connected with the Republican Party and conservatism (Hout and Fischer, 2002, 2014; Margolis,
2018; Patrikios, 2008; Putnam and Campbell, 2010). This occurs as members of the mass public
attempt to rectify the cognitive dissonance that occurs when their political and religious identities
do not align (Campbell et al., 2018; Margolis, 2018). These new findings suggest party elites may
not need to make efforts to cater to the religiosity of their voters as a voter’s partisanship will lead
their decision-making, even on religious issues.
If the Democrats are becoming the party of the non-religious, then why was there such a divide
amongst Democratic convention delegates? First, while Layman and Weaver (2016) find that a
growing number of Democratic activists are “actively secular,” meaning they embrace secular beliefs
and behaviors rather than simply rejecting religious beliefs and practices, 74% of Democrats still
identify as religious (Cox and Jones, 2017). This division within the Democratic party forces
Democratic candidates to walk a fine line. Candidates are faced with the balancing act of seeking
to court the funds and approval of an increasing number of secular activists and voters without
straying so far from religion that they risk alienating potential swaths of religious voters. This
act becomes particularly challenging because anti-religious language might alienate large swaths of
religious voters, but religious language risks alienating both non-religious voters and those voters
who associate religious language with the Republican Party.
What then is the risk-calculus that Democratic candidates face when they decide whether
or not to invoke religious messaging in their campaign efforts? Do all Democratic voters reject
religious messaging or does the use of religious language help build support among certain voters?
Do Republican candidates face a similar risk of alienating non-religious voters or is there an
understanding that being religious is part of what it means to be Republican? These are the
questions that this study intends to answer by examining voter responses to different types of
messaging from fictional party candidates to determine how Democratic and Republican voters
respond to the use of religious messaging and whether there are certain types of messaging that
appeals to a middle ground between religious and non-religious voters and activists. In particular, I
believe that moral messaging, or messaging that frames key issues as a matter of fundamental right
or wrong in a way that is distinctly not religious, might be a key strategy for candidates who want
to mobilize both religious and secular voters.
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A DEMOCRATIC DIVISION: THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS NONES AND SECULAR
PARTY ACTIVISTS
Over the past 25 years, the proportion of the population that does not identify with a religious
tradition has tripled, rising from 7% of the total population in 1991 to just under 23% of the total
population in 2014. These 56 million “Nones,” referring to those who answer “None of the Above”
when asked to select their religious affiliation in a survey, have outgrown mainstream religious
traditions such as Mainline Protestants, who make up 14.7% of the total population, and Roman
Catholics at 20.8%, and are now the second largest group in the American religious landscape
behind Evangelical Christians who are 25.4% of the total population (Lipka, 2015). This is a striking
change: for most of the 20th century, the United States stood out among western industrialized
countries due to its high levels of religiosity (Putnam and Campbell, 2010).
This shift in the religious landscape has significant political implications. First, citizens with
higher levels of religiosity are more likely to be civically and politically engaged than their nonreligious
counterparts (Putnam and Campbell, 2010; Verba et al., 1995). Therefore, a growing lack of religiosity
throughout the mass public may mean that religious activists end up with disproportionately louder
voices in the political arena. Additionally, the increasing polarization in American politics has been
accompanied by increasing religious differences between partisan and ideological camps leading to a
“God Gap” between the parties and their issue positions (Layman, 2001; Green, 2007). As a result,
this political polarization is one of the leading explanations for the recent surge in the percentage of
Americans claiming no religious affiliation. Liberals and Democrats reject organized religion more
as traditionalist religion becomes increasingly associated with conservatism and the Republican
Party (Campbell et al., 2018; Hout and Fischer, 2002, 2014).
This intermixing of religion and politics by aligning religion with the GOP may create cognitive
dissonance among religious Democrats and liberals who feel that their religious and political identities
are in conflict. Initial theories of cognitive dissonance argue that citizens seek for consistency between
their beliefs and behaviors. When an individual feels that these elements of cognition do not fit
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together, dissonance occurs (Festinger, 1957). The argument follows that cognitive dissonance is
unpleasant and often drives individuals to seek out ways to reduce these negative feelings. However,
not all inconsistent attitudes and behaviors will drive individuals to seek out dissonance reduction.
(For example, one can have inconsistent attitudes over one’s desire for a piece of cake.) As a
result, more recent theories of cognitive dissonance also emphasize the importance of the social
element surrounding the idea of preserving one’s “self-consistency” (see Kurzban and Aktipis (2007)
for a discussion). Kurzban and Aktipis (2007) argue that a desire for internal consistency “need
not, in itself, necessarily be a deep, fundamental motive. Instead, people might be motivated to
appear consistent, which in turn leads them to actually be consistent.” In this case, it is the desire
of appearing consistent to one’s social group that provides the necessary condition to seek out
dissonance reduction. An individual who experiences an intermixing of their religious and political
identities likely also has a desire to ensure that those two identities appear consistent to their social
circles, particularly to those ties created because of a particular social identity (i.e. one’s church
friends). Therefore, these individuals are likely to seek out ways to reduce the cognitive dissonance
they feel in order confirm for themselves and others that they practice what they preach (Aronson
et al., 1991). To resolve this dissonance, many citizens face a choice: they may either change their
political ties or their religious identity. As partisan identities become stronger and more chronically
salient for some individuals, these strong partisans are more likely to change their religious identity
(Campbell et al., 2018; Margolis, 2018; Hout and Fischer, 2002). As a result, the two identities
should reinforce each other. As Democrats increasingly become known as the party of “seculars”
and the Republicans become the party of the “religious” than secular social identities should “spur
stronger attachments to the Democratic party” (Layman et al., nd, p.10).
However, despite this cognitive dissonance, 74% of Democrats still identify as religious. It is
important to note, however, that the 74% of Democrats that still categorize themselves as religious
look quite different from the 89% of Republicans who categorize themselves as religious (Cox and
Jones, 2017). First, while a large percentage of Democrats may identify as religious, they are less
likely to have high levels of religiosity (Margolis, 2016). This means that Republicans are more likely
to be highly religious across denominational lines, where Democrats, even if they identify as religious,
are much more likely to have lower levels of religious attachment and may even be categorized as
“liminal,” a term describing the number of individuals who change between identifying as a None
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and claiming a religious affiliation over the course of a panel survey. This likely means that religious
Republicans consider their religious identity a far more central part of their political decision making
and more consistent with their stereotypes of their own party. As a result, these Republicans are
likely to not only expect religious language, but also to evaluate such rhetoric more positively than
their Democratic counterparts.
However, it would not be correct to say that all Democrats experience this cognitive dissonance
between their religious and political identities. In particular, African Americans provide an important
counterpoint to this narrative. One of the most cohesive demographic partisan blocs, a majority of
African Americans have consistently voted for the Democratic Party since the 1960s. Furthermore,
African Americans are the “single most religiously devout racial or ethnic group in the United
States” (Margolis, 2018; Putnam and Campbell, 2010; McDaniel and Ellison, 2008). To explain why
African Americans have remained so religious, despite their strong Democratic partisan attachments,
Margolis (2018, p.148) turns to the theology of black churches arguing that “the collective experience
of blacks in the United States” has greatly shaped black Protestant theology. Indeed, McDaniel and
Ellison (2008) point to the themes of fairness and equality throughout the church’s dogma. These
themes fit consistently with the platform of the Democratic party. As a result, Margolis (2018,
p.178) concludes that“if black Democrats do not feel as if their religious and partisan identities are
in conflict, they should see no reason to update either.”
This lack of conflict between political and religious identities likely coincides in part with the
many other racial and regional groups often associated with the different party coalitions. In
2016, 35% of Republicans were white evangelical protestants, compared to only 8% of Democrats.
Conversely, 17% of Democrats were Black Protestants and 10% were Hispanic Protestants, compared
to 3% of Republicans in each category (Cox and Jones, 2017). Furthermore, 85% of Republicans
and 66% of Democrats are Christian as are 88% of members of Congress. This explains why most
religious rhetoric used by congressional candidates will be based in the Christian tradition: members
of Congress are likely to reflect on their own faith traditions when speaking about religious issues
and they feel that this language will resonate well with a large number of their voters. This is
particularly consequential for Democratic candidates who may use Christian messaging with the
hopes of courting religious Democrats, but end up further alienating secularists and those of other
faiths.
5
These religious makeups are critical to understanding the ways that racial makeup and regional
concentrations may impact where religious messaging will be the most persuasive. The number
of white evangelical protestants is twice as large in the South and Midwest as they are in the
Northeast, making them the largest religious group in 13 southern states. Black protestants and
Hispanic Protestants are also largely concentrated in the South and often rank very highly on scales
of religiosity (Cox and Jones, 2017; Putnam and Campbell, 2010). Furthermore, in 20 states, largely
concentrated in the Western U.S., the religiously unaffiliated are the greatest share of residents in
each state. This indicates that there are racial and regional differences that may serve as moderating
factors for how likely candidates are to use religious messaging in certain areas or how appealing
this messaging will be to different certain swaths of voter.
This division among religious and nonreligious Democratic voters is further exacerbated by
the increasing role of secular party activists within the Democratic party. Layman and Weaver
(2016) find that over time there has been an increasing divide between Democratic and Republican
party activists with Republican activists becoming increasingly religious and Democratic activists
becoming increasingly secular and non-religious. As a result, today the two parties’ activists are
starkly divided along the religious dimension. In particular, they find that active secularism, or
a positive embrace of secular beliefs and practices, is increasing among the ranks of Democratic
activists. This is particularly important, they argue, because “active secularists are the most liberal
group in the Democratic Party”(Layman and Weaver, 2016, p.289). In a survey of the American
Humanist Association, an influential secular organization, Brockway (2017) finds that many active
seculars feel that the Democratic party does not do enough to reach out to nonreligious people
and that they would like to see the Democratic party do more to appeal to their interests. In a
similar way, Layman and Weaver (2016, p.289) find that active secularists are more likely than other
Democrats to “eschew political compromise in favor of an unyielding pursuit of ideological principles.”
This is particularly significant because Layman and Weaver (2016) also find that the religious
traditionalists operate in similar ways in their role as Republican party activists. These religious
traditionalists are more conservative than other Republicans and also unwilling to compromise on
their ideological beliefs. As a result, these two forces are acting against one another to further
ideologically polarize the two parties as they seek to draw candidates and politicians to their side,
making bipartisan compromise less likely.
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PARTY DISTINCTIVENESS AND COMPETITIVE MAJORITIES
This ideological distance between party activists is further fueled by increasingly competitive
majorities. In recent years, majority control in the House and the Senate have been won by narrow
margins, and in most elections, majority control is up for grabs as it shifts back and forth between
the parties election after election. Lee (2016) argues that this partisan competition motivates parties
to act strategically to emphasize the differences between themselves and the opposition party. This
process is what is referred to by congressional insiders as “party messaging” (Lee, 2016). It is a
critical way that parties sell themselves to voters, particularly party activists. The goal of party
messaging is to make the party’s position on a particular issue distinct, emphasizing the ways in
which the parties differ. Party messaging is not, however about “objectively and dispassionately
cataloguing all the issue positions that differentiate the two parties”(Lee, 2016, p.47). Instead, it is
about emphasizing where the party feels that it is on “the right side of public opinion” among their
voters, while prioritizing issues that unite the party and divide the opposition (Lee, 2016, p.47).
As a result, when partisans are distinctly divided on key issues such as religion, the use of religion
in party messaging can be a clear way to draw a distinction between the parties. In particular,
Republicans are more likely to use religious messaging because they know that it will divide the
Democrats.
As parties take on a larger role of “public relation operations,” the party leadership seeks to
control the communications coming out of Congress in search of the partisan advantage (Lee, 2016,
p.137). Party leaders work diligently to coordinate the activities of rank-and-file members, providing
them with prepared talking points for floor speeches and media events, in order to ensure that their
message hits the ears of activists and voters across the country. This coordination implies that
Republican party leaders likely encourage the use of religious messaging on issue positions because
being religious is central what it means to be Republican for many partisans and the party can use
this to emphasize its distinctiveness, while dividing Democratic voters. Democrats, on the other
hand, face a much different risk calculus. While party messaging might compel the Democratic
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party to distinguish itself from the religiosity of the Republican party, it cannot emphasize this in a
way that risks alienating their religious voters.
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RELIGIOUS VERSUS MORAL LANGUAGE: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION?
If religious language is a risky option for many Democratic candidates then what would a possible
middle ground strategy that does not put Democrats at a disadvantage look like? Religion has been
touted throughout much of the literature as one of the best mobilizing forces for many voters due
to its power as both a psychological and organizational mechanism. Religious beliefs can give voters
a strong sense of guidance and act as a solid foundation for building commitment and a sense of
efficacy in regards to a particular issue (Wald, 1987). Furthermore, religious social networks allow
individuals to develop strong social network ties and organizational skills that prepare them to
engage civically (Verba et al., 1995; Putnam and Campbell, 2010). As a result, religious messaging
is an important tool, not only because it signals similar group membership to a candidate’s religious
constituency (i.e. I’m a Christian like you), but also because it credibly signals an intensity of
preference. Religious beliefs are often strongly held and taking a religious position on a particular
issue might signal to voters that such an issue is a priority for the candidate and that she will not
waver in her commitment to a particular position under outside pressures. This is very attractive
to many voters and as a result, is a key tool for candidates. Democrats, however, face a dilemma
in this regard. Using religious language is a key way to signal commitment, but such a solution
will likely rub secularists the wrong way. How then can Democrats signal commitment? Is there a
strategy that could yield high turnout for Democrats without having to pick a side in the religious
landscape?
Recent findings in the moral psychology literature, suggest that though religion and morality
are often conflated in everyday speaking, the two are conceptually distinct, even when in relation
to issue-specific conviction (Skitka, Hanson, Washburn, and Mueller, 2018; Morgan, Skitka, and
Wisneski, 2010). Indeed, while conventional wisdom would suggest that religion plays a key role in
shaping people’s values and conception of morality, Skitka, Hanson, Washburn, and Mueller (2018)
find no evidence of this connection. Instead, their evidence supports the idea that an individual’s
issue-specific moral convictions, or the extent to which an individual believes her position on an
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issue is related to her beliefs about fundamental right and wrong, is more likely to be a strong driver
of political engagement than her religious conviction, or the connection of her issue position to her
religious belief. This is likely due to the fact that moral conviction is a more intuitive and emotional
concept that exists universally across human beings, while religious conviction is more cognitive
and socially constructed.
Furthermore, while religious conviction can influence some moral intuitions of some individuals,
it is only one source of morality. Atheists and other non-religious Americans also have moral
intuitions, and religious individuals have moral intuitions that are not at all grounded in religious
beliefs. Moral intuitions also are independent of authority in a way that distinguishes them from
not only religious conviction, which tends to be based more on the directives of church leaders and
important documents, like the Pope or the Bible, but also from other social norms. In particular,
moral intuitions are distinguishable from social norms in that an authority figure can suspend the
latter but not the former. For example, A teacher can say “Tomorrow you can wear pajamas to
school” but not “Tomorrow you can hit your classmates” (Smetana, 1983). In a similar way, one’s
religious conviction might allow a teacher to say “Jesus says you shouldn’t hit your classmates,”
but that likely stems from a similar sense of moral conviction as a teacher who says “You shouldn’t
hit your classmates because it’s wrong,” just imbued with a different, religious, cognitive reason for
why the action shouldn’t occur.
If moralizing an issue could activate the same levels of engagement traditionally associated
religiosity, then it may be a strong strategy for Democratic candidates. What’s more there is
evidence that these convictions may exert a far-reaching force beyond issues traditionally considered
to be moral issues, such as abortion and gay marriage, to a wide range of issues, even economic
issues (Ryan, 2014). Additionally, Ryan (2019) finds that morally convicted issue positions do not
change when voters receive new information about a particular policy and will even lead citizens
to reject arguments that are based in cost/benefit reasoning. Therefore, candidates couching their
issue positions in terms of right and wrong could be a particularly motivating message for their
constituents.
While moralizing an issue poses many benefits for Democratic candidates seeking to walk a fine
line between religious and nonreligious, it does have possible disadvantages. In particular, Ryan
(2014) notes that while increased engagement and fervor can be positive things in a democratic
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society, they can also be divisive. Moralized attitudes about policy positions can lead citizens to
“oppose compromises, punish compromising politicians, and forsake material gains” (Ryan, 2017).
This could be particularly problematic when policies create divisions within the party, leading




The literature suggests that candidates from the two parties face a different levels of risk when they
decide to use religious messaging that are based on how their voters respond. For Republicans,the
increasing interconnection of traditional religion and the Republican party means that nonreligious
Republicans are likely to accept religious messaging as being part of what it means to be a Republican.
For a Democratic candidate, on the other hand, the risk seems to lie much more with either invoking
religious messaging that may alienate nonreligious Democrats or speaking against religion in a way
that may alienate religious Democrats. The Democratic strategy, therefore, may be to invoke moral
messaging that does not rely on religious overtones that will strike a balance between the opposing
sides. Here religious messaging refers to messaging that invokes direction from sources of religious
authority such as religious leaders or important documents (i.e. Jesus says or the Bible says) or
appeals to shared religious traditions (i.e. we, as Christians). Moral messaging, on the other hand,
frames issues as matters of right and wrong. Additionally, moral messaging often appeals to a sense
of shared humanity as a way of emphasizing the universality of moral convictions.
In order to understand the risk calculus that candidates face in invoking religious messaging,
it is critical to first understand how voters react to different types of messaging. As a result, my
hypotheses develop a theory of how voters will react to candidate appeals which will inform my
understanding of candidate campaign strategies.1
Devotion to God and Country: Republicans and Religious Messaging
The connection between traditionalist religion and the Republican party means that Republican
candidates should seek to appeal to religious voters even if they are not themselves religious.
Voters will expect to see candidates take strong religiously conservative positions, particularly on
traditionally religious issues, such as abortion. Even nonreligious Republicans respond positively to
this type of messaging because it represents part of what it means to be Republican. The risk for
1All of these hypotheses were preregistered with Open Science Framework.
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Republicans may lie in not invoking enough religious messaging, particularly if the issue in question
is traditionally thought of as a religious issue. This leads me to my first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Religious and nonreligious Republican voters will respond positively to religious
messaging from a Republican candidate and will have higher levels of affect for candidates
who invoke religious messaging than for those who do not.
Here my dependent variables measuring respondent’s evaluations of fictional candidates will
vary based on a voter’s level of religiosity or secularism as well as the moral or religious frame of
the messaging.
Good without God: Democrats, Morality and Campaign Messaging
If 74% of Democrats are religious (even if this number includes members who are relatively low in
religiosity), then the Democrats cannot move to messaging against religion to appeal to a growing
number of secular voters without alienating potential key voting sources, particularly in certain
geographic areas like the south and among certain racial groups, particularly African American and
Hispanics, where religiosity levels are high. However, many Democrats reject organized religion, and,
as a result, would reject religious messaging from a Democratic candidate. How then do Democrats
appeal to both sides of this party divide? As mentioned previously, the answer likely lies in relying
on messaging that is moral but not religious.
Using moral messaging to convey particular issue positions may be particularly advantageous
for Democratic candidates as activating a voter’s moral conviction around a particular issue may
contribute to her willingness to become politically engaged as her firm beliefs will motivate them to
take a stand for a particular issue. Furthermore, I expect that while religious Democrats will respond
more positively to religious messaging from candidates than secular Democrats, all Democrats will
have higher levels of enthusiasm for candidates who do not use religious messaging, because of the
associations between organized religion and the Republican Party. As Democrats begin to view that
to be religious is to be Republican, they should reject the use of explicit religious language. This
leads me to a series of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2: Religious Democrats will respond more postively to religious language than
secular Democrats.
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Hypothesis 3: Religious and secular Democrats will both have higher levels of enthusiasm and
affect for candidates using moral reasoning than candidates using religious reasoning.
Here my dependent variables measuring respondent’s evaluations of fictional candidates will
vary based on a voter’s level of religiosity or secularism as well as the moral or religious frame of
the messaging.
Good without Government: Public Secularism and Campaign Messaging
Using moral messaging does not come without risks, however, even when both religious and secular
Democrats are likely to agree on a particular issue. Many voters, both Democrats and Republicans,
religious and nonreligious, object to intermixing of religion and government in the public sphere. In
other words, there are many voters who feel as though it is not the government’s job to impose
moral policies on those who do not share their beliefs or to interfere with the running of religious
organizations.
This is where public secularism is particularly important. As mentioned earlier, public secularism
encompasses attitudes about the role of religion in government and the public spaces. As a result,
it is possible to be highly religious and also strongly supportive of public secularism (Campbell
et al., 2018). It is just as likely that religious voters want to keep the state out of their religious
beliefs as nonreligious voters want to keep religion out of their government. As a result, religious
and nonreligious voters may reject religious campaign messaging because of their desire for public
secularism. If an individual views such messaging as candidates imposing their religious beliefs or
the religious beliefs of their party on others through policy initiatives, they will respond negatively
regardless of party or religiosity. This brings me to my final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: An individual’s belief in public secularism will lead her to respond negatively
to religious messaging regardless of her level of religiosity or partisan identity.
Here I anticipate that a desire to keep church and state separate will lead individuals to reject
candidates who invoke either religious or moral messaging. My dependent variable of response to
candidate messaging should vary based on how highly an individual values public secularism.
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DATA AND METHODS
In order to test my hypotheses, I first look at how voters respond to different types of messaging
from fictional party candidates. Measuring the enthusiasm, affect, and trust a respondent feels
towards the candidate after being exposed to a candidates moral or religious rhetoric helps me to
determine how much risk Democratic and Republican candidates face when they opt to use religious
messaging and whether there are certain types of messaging, particularly moral messaging, that can
help Democratic candidates appeal to a middle ground between their religious and non-religious
voters and activists.
In order to measure voters candidate evaluations, I designed a survey experiment that was
fielded as part of the recent Politics in the Field at the University of North Carolina (P-FUNC)
survey, conducted through Qualtrics. The first part of the survey includes a battery of questions
measuring both religiosity and active secularism. These batteries consist of religious affiliation
questions as well as questions about both religious and secular beliefs, devotion, and practices.
Additionally, the first wave of the survey asks questions about public secularism, ideology, and
other demographic questions. This first part also includes questions measuring of respondent issue
attitudes regarding capital punishment and US humanitarian intervention in foreign countries. For
each issue, respondents also report the issue’s importance to them and whether the respondent has
religious or moral convictions regarding each issue.
After a series of other questions measuring unrelated political and social attitudes, respondents
are then randomly assigned into treatment conditions that present religious and moral reasoning,
non-religious and moral reasoning, and non-religious and non-moral reasoning for a given issue
position. The candidate statement each respondent receives will echo her partisan identification as
well as her chosen position on each issue from earlier in the survey. This allows me to effectively block
randomize on partisanship and issue position which helps to ensure that the subject’s evaluation
of the candidate is based primarily on the nature of the candidate’s reasoning and not because of
differences in partisanship or issue opinion. Additionally, attempts to study how partisans respond
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to the use of religious language by candidates of the opposing side would likely be a better measure
of out-party affect than of a response to religious messaging. Furthermore, these distinctions might
matter more in primary elections where voters are not able to use partisanship as a decision-making
shortcut.
Table 1 presents the candidate statements given for those who favor capital punishment.2 The
religious and moral treatment includes explicitly religious language, in particular explicitly Christian
language with references to God, Jesus, and the Bible, as the justification for a candidate’s beliefs.
Alternatively, in the non-religious and moral treatment, the fictional candidate justifies his position
by referring to how it is connected to his beliefs in fundamental right and wrong. Finally, the
non-religious and non-moral treatment uses economic justifications for the candidate’s position. The
treatment conditions were randomly assigned for the 2,050 respondents allowing me to determine
how a respondent’s candidate evaluations differ after seeing combinations of religious, moral, and
economic candidate reasoning.3
2A manipulation check examining how respondents view the question wording is available in the Supporting
Information.
3An ideal within subjects experimental design might have been to include three issues so that each respondent
would see all three treatment conditions, but this was not possible given space restrictions. My design still allows
me to disentangle the effect of rhetoric from specific issues, and to examine responses to two different rhetorical
approaches within the same respondent.
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...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently
articulated his opposition to the use of capital punishment in the United States.
When called to explain his stance, Mr. Smith pointed to his beliefs about right
and wrong: We, as a society, have a social contract with each other. At the heart
of this contract is the preservation of human life. This means that all life is
valuable even the lives of those who commit crime. We cannot teach that killing
is wrong by killing. We must find another way to pursue justice for the victims.
Religious and
Moral
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently
articulated his opposition to the use of capital punishment in the United States.
When called on to explain his stance, Mr. Smith pointed to his religious
convictions: The Bible says Thou shall not kill. The use of capital punishment is
an attack on human dignity. Human life is sacred and we, as a nation, must seek





...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently
articulated his opposition to the use of capital punishment in the United States.
When called to explain his stance, Mr. Smith pointed to economic principles: A
death penalty trial is extremely expensive and puts strain on the resources of our
justice system. In our current economic climate, we cannot not afford to be
using capital punishment as an option. Particularly, when the burdens of these
costs place a harsher punishment on low-income defendants.
The final piece of the survey has respondents answer questions about their feelings of enthusiasm,
affect, and trust towards the candidate. These dependent variables allow me to measure differences in
the levels of positive and negative responses to particular candidates, which serves as an important
indicator of how likely a respondent would be to support such a candidate in a true election
environment.4




Due to the within subjects design of my survey experiment, I chose to stipulate a multilevel model
with random effects for both issue and subject to account for the effects of heterogeneity in both
issue (respondents answered the same questions for two different issues) and subject(respondents
saw different groups of treatment blocks).
Table 2 presents the fixed effects for the different treatments and the random effects of issue
and subject on the candidate affect outcome variable. This model indicates that respondents liked a
candidate more when they saw him using economic or moral reasoning than religious reasoning.
This pattern holds across partisan groups. Though Republicans do not prefer moral reasoning over
religious reasoning to the same extent as Democratic respondents, moral messaging still appears
to be the preference of all respondents. While this provides support for my second hypotheses,
the results run counter to expectation as I hypothesized that Republican respondents would favor
religious language because I expected that the increased association between organized religion with
the Republican Party would likely make Republicans more accepting of religious language from
candidates.
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Table 2: Treatment Effect on Affect for Candidates
All Subjects Democrats Republicans
Economic Treatment 0.36∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.40∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Moral Treatment 0.54∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.48∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
(Intercept) 3.33∗∗ 3.28∗∗ 3.49∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.11)
AIC 8732.71 4300.24 3565.80
BIC 8768.77 4332.02 3596.60
Log Likelihood -4360.35 -2144.12 -1776.90
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: Subject 1507 737 626
Num. groups: Issue 2 2 2
Var: Subject (Intercept) 0.36 0.36 0.30
Var: Issue (Intercept) 0.01 0.00 0.02
Var: Residual 0.75 0.76 0.73
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
The Role of Church Attendance
To further test my hypotheses, I included interactions between the fixed effects of the treatment
groups with respondents’ frequency of church attendance. In this model, I include a two way
interaction of religious attendance and treatment condition. In this analysis, Independents who lean
towards one party or the other are coded as partisans. Additionally, I have recoded the church
attendance respondents into three categories. Respondents were asked “Aside from weddings and
funerals, how often do you attend religious services?” Those who responded “Once a Week” or
“More than Once a Week” were coded as Frequently Attend, those who responded “Once or Twice
a Month,” “A few times a year,” or “Seldom” were coded as Sometimes Attend, and those who
responded “Never” were coded as Never Attend.
Figure 1 presents the predicted values plot for this model across partisan groups.5 In the figure,
there is a significant and substantial preference for non-religious language among all non-religious
respondents, regardless of party, though non-religious Republicans have slightly higher candidate
5Full model is in the Supporting Information.
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evaluation for those candidates using religious language. Across parties, responses to religious
language increase among respondents who attend church more frequently.
Additionally, all but the most religious Democrats significantly prefer moral language to religious
language. Furthermore, while there is not a significant difference between different treatment groups
for the most religious Democrats, the candidate evaluations among those who received the moral
treatment are the highest, suggesting that Democrats prefer moral messaging. This provides support
for my second and third hypotheses, which posited that religious Democrats will respond more
positively to religious language than secular Democrats, but that all Democrats would prefer moral
language to religious language. Among Republicans, there is no significant difference among the three
treatment types for religious Republicans, though the evaluations for candidates using moral and
economic language are higher than for religious language. This runs counter to my first hypothesis
which posited that religious and nonreligious Republican voters will have higher levels of affect for
candidates who invoke religious messaging than for those who do not.
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On the x axis, 1 is Never Attend Church, 2 is Some Church Attendance (Seldom/Monthly/A few
times a year), and 3 is Frequent Church Attendance (Once a week or more)
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The results presented here are the treatment effects on my affect dependent variable. In the
Supporting Information, the models for the treatment effects on the enthusiasm and trust outcome
variables are also presented. These models show a similar pattern to the affect results presented here
with respondents responding most positively to moral messaging and least positively to religious
messaging.
Public Secularism
Table 3 examines the effects of public secularism on affect ratings for candidates. When interacted
with treatment effects, public secularism significantly and substantially increases a respondent’s
affect for the candidate under both the economic and moral treatment in comparison to the religious
treatment, particularly for Democratic respondents. The effects for Republicans are much smaller
and insignificant. This provides mixed support for hypothesis 4. While public secularism, or the
belief in the need for a high wall of separation between church and state, does significantly predict the
likelihood that a respondent will prefer the non-religious treatments, this effect primarily holds for
Democrats. This indicates that while Republicans also preferred the moral and economic treatments
to the religious one, public secularism is not a primary source of motivation.
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Table 3: The Effect of Public Secularism on Affect for Candidate
All Democrats Republicans
Public Secularism −0.42∗∗ −0.54∗∗ −0.14
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
Economic Treatment 0.11 −0.10 0.32∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Moral Treatment 0.31∗∗ 0.16 0.45∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Public Secularism X Economic Treatment 0.44∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.20
(0.08) (0.12) (0.13)
Public Secularism X Moral Treatment 0.41∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.07
(0.08) (0.12) (0.13)
(Intercept) 3.57∗∗ 3.65∗∗ 3.55∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
AIC 8704.53 4278.41 3577.20
BIC 8758.63 4326.07 3623.40
Log Likelihood -4343.26 -2130.21 -1779.60
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: Subject 1507 737 626
Num. groups: Issue 2 2 2
Var: Subject (Intercept) 0.36 0.37 0.30
Var: Issue (Intercept) 0.01 0.00 0.02
Var: Residual 0.74 0.73 0.73
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Moral and Religious Conviction
Finally, Table 4 examines the effect that moral and religious conviction have on a respondent’s
affect towards a particular candidate. Here the results suggest that higher levels of issue-specific
religious conviction led to significant and substantially lower candidate evaluations from the moral
and economic treatments than in the religious treatment condition. Moral conviction, however, had
mixed results. For Democrats, higher levels of moral conviction led to higher candidate evaluations
in the moral treatment condition compared to the religious treatment condition. This provides
support for the argument that Democrats, especially those who are high in levels of moral conviction,
are more likely to be receptive to moral messaging. For Republicans, moral conviction has a small
and insignificant impact on candidate evaluations.
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Table 4: Effect of Moral and Religious Conviction on Affect for Candidate
All Democrats Republicans
Religious Conviction 0.25∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Economic Topic 1.06∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 1.30∗∗
(0.12) (0.18) (0.18)
Moral Topic 0.94∗∗ 0.78∗∗ 1.04∗∗
(0.12) (0.17) (0.18)
Moral Conviction 0.07∗ −0.02 0.18∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Economic Treatment X RC −0.29∗∗ −0.32∗∗ −0.23∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Moral Treatment X RC −0.28∗∗ −0.36∗∗ −0.17∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Economic Treatment X MC −0.00 0.11∗ −0.10
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Moral Treatment X MC 0.08∗ 0.19∗∗ −0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
(Intercept) 2.54∗∗ 2.58∗∗ 2.57∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.15)
AIC 8596.97 4226.26 3530.40
BIC 8669.11 4289.81 3591.99
Log Likelihood -4286.49 -2101.13 -1753.20
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: caseid 1507 737 626
Num. groups: issue 2 2 2
Var: caseid (Intercept) 0.35 0.33 0.30
Var: issue (Intercept) 0.01 0.00 0.01
Var: Residual 0.70 0.71 0.68
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The goal of this study is to develop a better understanding not only of the differences in voter response
to religious and moral messaging, but also the changing role of religion in political campaigns.
Voters responding less positively to religious language than other types of messaging suggests that
candidates should move away from overtly religious language. They may instead default to moral
language, the most positively received type of messaging, thus allowing them to mobilize their bases
without creating a division between religious and non-religious voters.
Additionally, my results call into question the role of religiosity as an “unmoved mover.” If
religion were to be a steady stable influence on candidate evaluations, one might expect that religious
messaging would be more positively received than other types of messaging by those who attend
church frequently. Instead, the results find that such messaging is less popular than all other types
of messaging across all categories of church attendance. This suggests that partisanship, particularly
when partisan issue positions are imbued with moral significance, is a more salient social identity in
an voter’s political decision making.
Beyond this study, future research should examine the risk calculus that exists for utilizing
moral messaging. While utilizing moral messaging on an issue where religious and secular Democrats
may disagree, like abortion, may pose a greater risk to candidates because it will make partisans
less willing to compromise with each other, using such messaging on issues where there is general
agreement among Democrats, such as providing social welfare services, will likely lead to more
agreement between religious and secular Democrats because this messaging is appealing to their
moral convictions which are likely rooted in their religious or secular belief system. The potential
divisiveness of moral language, however, suggests that it should be employed strategically in order
to avoid intra-party divisions.
Further investigation is needed to determine whether different types of religious language,
particularly religious language that evokes a emotional response, impact the ways in which voters
respond. The religious messaging here is highly cognitive and appeals to religious authority figures
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such as Jesus and the Bible, but more emotional appeals may illicit a different response. Additionally,
further examination into why party elites continue to use religious rhetoric in elections and other
political contexts may provide key insight into what types of religious language are the most effective.
If voters are not responsive to religious messaging in elections, then perhaps members of Congress
are signaling to other sources: party activists, donors, or party elites. What’s more, members of
Congress, particularly Republican members of Congress, often couch their policies and platforms in
religious language to appeal to conservative religious voters, but this may not be the most effective
strategy. Developing a better understanding of who candidates and legislators are signaling to when
they use religious language will be instrumental to determining the power that religious messaging
has. Additionally, if candidates feel the need to religious language because of the pull of other





The following figures illustrate the results of the manipulation check for my experimental treatments.
This test was run on a sample of 155 UNC undergraduates as part of the political science subject
pool. The survey experiment was set up to mimic the experimental design of paper. Each respondent
saw three fictional candidate statements about three different issues: one for each of the moral,
religious, and economic treatments. The statements provided reasoning for a candidate’s position
on capital punishment, foreign intervention, and the regulation of SNAP benefits. The capital
punishment and foreign intervention treatments were identical to the ones used in the P-FUNC
survey and will be the focus of the manipulation check.
In each candidate statement, the candidate was a co-partisan who shared the same issue position
as the respondent. Respondents were then asked “To what extent does this message appear to
stem from the candidate’s religious beliefs?” and “To what extent does this message appear to
stem from the candidate’s beliefs about fundamental right and wrong¿‘ Figures MC-1 and MC-2
show the average rating for each of the treatments from the respondents who saw them. In each
figure, the results are divided by those respondents who saw the “favor” statement, or a candidate
statement where the candidate took a favorable stance to the issue (i.e. in support of capital
punishment), and those respondents who saw the “oppose” statement, or a candidate statement
where the candidate was in opposition to a particular issue (i.e. against capital punishment). As
the favor and oppose statements were different for each treatment, this distinction is necessary to
ensure all moral treatments were being interpreted as moral and all religious treatments were being
interpreted as religious.
The Figures show that my experimental treatments largely test what they were intended to.
In all cases, the moral treatment was interpreted as moral, but not religious, while the religious
treatment interpreted as very religious and at least somewhat moral. The economic treatment was
considered less moral than the religious or moral treatments for capital punishment, but just as
moral and more moral than the religious treatment for foreign intervention. This is likely because
the issue itself relates to “defending human rights” which is likely a moral issue for younger college
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students regardless of framing. Overall, I conclude that my treatments are being interpreted in the
way that I intended, providing further support for my findings.
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Would you call yourself a STRONG Democrat or a NOT VERY STRONG Democrat?
• Strong
• Not very strong
Would you call yourself a STRONG Republican or a NOT VERY STRONG Republican?
• Strong
• Not very strong
Do you think of yourself as CLOSER to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?
• Closer to the Democratic Party
• Closer to the Republican Party
• Neither
Church Attendance
Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?
• More than once a week
• Once a week
• Once or twice a month
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Which of the following statements comes closer to your views?
• There should be a high wall of separation between church and state.
• The government should take special steps to protect Americas religious heritage.
Treatments
CP is Capital Punishment, FI is Foreign Intervention
McDonald Block 2 (CP, Moral)
Favor Position
During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the use
of the death penalty in the United States . Candidates campaign for capital punishment
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently articulated his support
for the use of capital punishment in the United States. When called on to explain his stance, Mr.
Smith pointed to his beliefs about right and wrong: We, as a society, have a social contract with
each other. At the heart of this contract is the preservation of human life. Those who break this
contract by unlawfully taking the lives of innocent people have committed an unjust act and thus
deserve the death penalty. By retaining the use of the capital punishment as an option, we ensure
that justice is served for the victims and their families.
Oppose Position
During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the use
of the death penalty in the United States.
Candidates campaign against capital punishment
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...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently articulated his opposition
to the use of capital punishment in the United States. When called to explain his stance, Mr. Smith
pointed to his beliefs about right and wrong: We, as a society, have a social contract with each
other. At the heart of this contract is the preservation of human life. This means that all life is
valuable even the lives of those who commit crime. We cannot teach that killing is wrong by killing.
We must find another way to pursue justice for the victims.
McDonald Block 2 (FI, Economic)
Favor Position
During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the role
of U.S. foreign intervention.
Candidates campaign for more U.S. foreign intervention
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently argued his support for
more U.S. foreign intervention. When called on to explain his stance, Mr. Jones pointed to the
economic principles: In an increasingly interconnected world, such human rights abuses and public
health crises threaten global financial stability with far reaching effects and we have a responsibility
to help protect the global economy.
Oppose position
During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the role
of U.S. foreign intervention.
Candidates campaign for less U.S. foreign intervention
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently argued his support
for less U.S. foreign intervention by promising. When called on to explain his stance, Mr. Jones
pointed to the economic principles: While defending human rights is undoubtedly an important goal,
recent evidence shows that U.S. intervention is costly and often extends conflict. It is important to
focus our limited resources on national defense and helping to solve problems on our own soil before
providing aid elsewhere.
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McDonald Block 2 (CP, Religious)
Favor position
During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the use
of the death penalty in the United States.
Candidates campaign for capital punishment
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] candidates for the House of Representatives recently articulated
his support for the use of capital punishment in the United States. When called on to explain his
stance, Mr. Smith pointed to his religious convictions: The Bible says Whoever sheds the blood of
man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image. Life is sacred and we,
as a nation, must retain capital punishment as an option to provide justice to families and punish
those who disobey our laws and the laws of God.
Oppose Position
During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the use
of the death penalty in the United States.
Candidates campaign against capital punishment
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently articulated his opposition
to the use of capital punishment in the United States. When called on to explain his stance, Mr.
Smith pointed to his religious convictions: The Bible says Thou shall not kill. The use of capital
punishment is an attack on human dignity. Human life is sacred and we, as a nation, must seek to
protect all lives and pursue justice for victims without the use of capital punishment.
McDonald Block 2 (FI, Moral)
Favor Position
During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the role
of U.S. foreign intervention.
Candidates campaign for more U.S. foreign intervention
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently argued his support for
more U.S. foreign intervention. When called on to explain his stance, Mr. Jones pointed to his
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beliefs about right and wrong: We are all members of a global community and we have a duty to
protect each other from the human rights abuses and living conditions that threaten our shared
humanity. Its the right thing to do.
Oppose Position
During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the role
of U.S. foreign intervention.
Candidates campaign for less U.S. foreign intervention
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently argued his support for
less U.S. foreign intervention. When called on to explain his stance, Mr. Jones pointed to his beliefs
about right and wrong: While defending human rights is undoubtedly an important goal, recent
evidence shows that U.S. intervention compounds the suffering of our fellow global citizens instead
of relieving it. Instead, the right thing to do is to focus U.S. resources on alleviating the suffering of
our fellow Americans while empowering global aid organizations to take up this humanitarian mantle.
McDonald Block 2 ( CP, Economic)
Favor Position
During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the use
of the death penalty in the United States.
Candidates campaign for capital punishment
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently articulated his support
for the use of capital punishment in the United States. When called on to explain his stance, Mr.
Smith pointed to the economic principles: Detaining criminals in prison for life is very expensive.
We, as a society, should not have to pay the price of those who have broken our laws. Retaining the
use of capital punishment as an option is the most economic way to ensure that justice is served for
the victims and their families.
Oppose Position
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During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the use
of the death penalty in the United States.
Candidates campaign against capital punishment
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently articulated his opposition
to the use of capital punishment in the United States. When called to explain his stance, Mr. Smith
pointed to economic principles: A death penalty trial is extremely expensive and puts strain on
the resources of our justice system. In our current economic climate, we cannot not afford to be
using capital punishment as an option. Particularly, when the burdens of these costs place a harsher
punishment on low-income defendants.
McDonald Block 2 (FI, Religious)
Favor Position
During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the role
of U.S. foreign intervention.
Candidates campaign for more U.S. foreign intervention
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently argued his support for
more U.S. foreign intervention. When called on to explain his stance, Mr. Jones pointed to his
religious convictions: Jesus calls for us to beat our swords into plowshares for the betterment of the
poorest among us. Gods church is universal and that means using the great wealth of our country
to help our brothers and sisters in Christ.
Oppose Position
During each election cycle, candidates take positions on a wide variety of important current events.
The following is an excerpt from a recent news article summarizing candidate positions on the role
of U.S. foreign intervention.
Candidates campaign for less U.S. foreign intervention
...One of the [PARTY candidates for] the House of Representatives recently argued his support
for less U.S. foreign intervention. When called on to explain his stance, Mr. Jones pointed to his
religious convictions: While defending human rights is undoubtedly a Christian goal, recent evidence
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shows that U.S. intervention compounds the suffering of our brothers and sisters in Christ instead
relieving it. Instead, we should empower religious missionaries to take up Christs mission without
using U.S. resources to extend global conflict.
Dependent Variables (seen after each of the treatment blocks, 2 treatment blocks per
subject)
How well do each of the following statements describe your feelings towards this candidate?
(Seen in grid)
• I like this candidate
• I feel enthusiastic about this candidate








Full Models From Text
Table 5: Effect of Church Attendance on Affect for Candidate
All Democrats Republicans
Economic Topic 0.79∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.79∗∗
(0.08) (0.11) (0.13)
Moral Topic 0.89∗∗ 0.88∗∗ 0.86∗∗
(0.08) (0.11) (0.13)
Sometimes Attend 0.41∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.26∗
(0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
Frequent Attend 0.79∗∗ 0.87∗∗ 0.55∗∗
(0.09) (0.13) (0.13)
Economic X Sometimes −0.46∗∗ −0.47∗∗ −0.33∗
(0.10) (0.14) (0.16)
Moral X Sometimes −0.37∗∗ −0.30∗ −0.46∗∗
(0.10) (0.14) (0.16)
Economic X Frequent −0.79∗∗ −0.73∗∗ −0.72∗∗
(0.11) (0.16) (0.17)
Moral X Frequent −0.66∗∗ −0.72∗∗ −0.54∗∗
(0.11) (0.16) (0.16)
(Intercept) 2.93∗∗ 2.88∗∗ 3.19∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.14)
AIC 8675.70 4278.35 3565.70
BIC 8747.83 4341.90 3627.29
Log Likelihood -4325.85 -2127.17 -1770.85
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: Subject 1507 737 626
Num. groups: Issue 2 2 2
Var: Subject (Intercept) 0.35 0.34 0.32
Var: Issue (Intercept) 0.01 0.00 0.02
Var: Residual 0.73 0.75 0.71
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Models for Enthusiasm for Candidate
Treatment Effects
Table 6: Treatment Effect on Enthusiasm for Candidate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Economic Treatment 0.34∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.39∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Moral Treatment 0.53∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.48∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
(Intercept) 3.13∗∗ 3.09∗∗ 3.26∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09)
AIC 8737.15 4338.85 3551.33
BIC 8773.22 4370.62 3582.12
Log Likelihood -4362.58 -2163.42 -1769.66
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: caseid 1507 737 626
Num. groups: issue 2 2 2
Var: caseid (Intercept) 0.43 0.45 0.37
Var: issue (Intercept) 0.00 0.00 0.01
Var: Residual 0.71 0.73 0.67
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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On the x axis, 1 is Never Attend Church, 2 is Some Church Attendance (Seldom/Monthly/A few
times a year), and 3 is Frequent Church Attendace (Once a week or more)
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Model behind SI-1
Table 7: Effect of Church Attendance on Enthusiasm for Candidate
All Democrats Republicans
Economic Treatment 0.69∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.73∗∗
(0.08) (0.11) (0.13)
Moral Treatment 0.90∗∗ 0.96∗∗ 0.83∗∗
(0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
Sometimes Attend 0.35∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.21
(0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
Frequent Attend 0.78∗∗ 0.96∗∗ 0.50∗∗
(0.09) (0.13) (0.13)
Economic X Sometimes −0.36∗∗ −0.40∗∗ −0.30
(0.10) (0.13) (0.16)
Moral X Sometimes −0.39∗∗ −0.39∗∗ −0.39∗
(0.10) (0.14) (0.15)
Economic X Frequent −0.67∗∗ −0.70∗∗ −0.63∗∗
(0.11) (0.16) (0.17)
Moral X Frequent −0.70∗∗ −0.85∗∗ −0.53∗∗
(0.11) (0.16) (0.16)
(Intercept) 2.76∗∗ 2.68∗∗ 3.00∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
AIC 8683.72 4307.78 3556.33
BIC 8755.85 4371.32 3617.92
Log Likelihood -4329.86 -2141.89 -1766.16
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: Subject 1507 737 626
Num. groups: Issue 2 2 2
Var: Subject (Intercept) 0.42 0.43 0.38
Var: Issue (Intercept) 0.00 0.00 0.01
Var: Residual 0.69 0.71 0.66
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Public Secularism
Table 8: The Effect of Public Secularism on Enthusiasm for Candidate
All Democrats Republicans
Public Secularism −0.41∗∗ −0.57∗∗ −0.17
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
Economic Treatment 0.13∗ −0.06 0.31∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Moral Treatment 0.32∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.40∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Public Secularism X Economic 0.36∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.20
(0.08) (0.12) (0.13)
Public Secularism X Moral 0.38∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.20
(0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
(Intercept) 3.37∗∗ 3.48∗∗ 3.33∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
AIC 8713.83 4319.74 3561.95
BIC 8767.93 4367.40 3608.15
Log Likelihood -4347.92 -2150.87 -1771.98
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: Subject 1507 737 626
Num. groups: Issue 2 2 2
Var: Subject (Intercept) 0.43 0.44 0.38
Var: Issue (Intercept) 0.00 0.00 0.01
Var: Residual 0.70 0.72 0.67
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Moral and Religious Conviction
Table 9: Effect of Religious and Moral Conviction on Enthusiasm for Candidate
All Democrats Republicans
Religious Conviction (RC) 0.24∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Economic Treatment 0.91∗∗ 0.74∗∗ 1.10∗∗
(0.12) (0.18) (0.17)
Moral Treatment 0.86∗∗ 0.84∗∗ 0.93∗∗
(0.12) (0.18) (0.17)
Moral Conviction (MC) 0.05∗ 0.01 0.13∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Economic X RC −0.24∗∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.24∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Moral X RC −0.24∗∗ −0.32∗∗ −0.14∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Economic X MC 0.00 0.05 −0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Moral X MC 0.07∗ 0.15∗∗ −0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
(Intercept) 2.40∗∗ 2.35∗∗ 2.43∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
AIC 8628.67 4283.13 3524.88
BIC 8700.81 4346.68 3586.47
Log Likelihood -4302.34 -2129.57 -1750.44
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: Subject 1507 737 626
Num. groups: Issue 2 2 2
Var: Subject (Intercept) 0.40 0.39 0.36
Var: Issue (Intercept) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Var: Residual 0.68 0.71 0.64
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Models for Trust in Candidate
Treatment Effects
Table 10: Treatment Effect on Trust for Candidate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Economic Treatment 0.17∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Moral Treatment 0.39∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.35∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
(Intercept) 3.20∗∗ 3.16∗∗ 3.32∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.11)
AIC 8542.94 4213.62 3511.81
BIC 8579.01 4245.39 3542.61
Log Likelihood -4265.47 -2100.81 -1749.91
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: Subject 1507 737 626
Num. groups: Issue 2 2 2
Var: Subject (Intercept) 0.53 0.55 0.49
Var: Issue (Intercept) 0.01 0.00 0.02
Var: Residual 0.59 0.60 0.58
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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On the x axis, 1 is Never Attend Church, 2 is Some Church Attendance (Seldom/Monthly/A few
times a year), and 3 is Frequent Church Attendace (Once a week or more)
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Model for Figure SI-2
Table 11: Effect of Church Attendance on Trust for Candidate
All Democrats Republicans
Economic Treatment 0.49∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12)
Moral Treatment 0.69∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.57∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12)
Sometimes Attend 0.36∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.28∗
(0.08) (0.10) (0.12)
Frequent Attend 0.77∗∗ 0.96∗∗ 0.57∗∗
(0.08) (0.12) (0.13)
Economic X Sometimes −0.35∗∗ −0.44∗∗ −0.21
(0.09) (0.12) (0.15)
Moral X Sometimes −0.36∗∗ −0.46∗∗ −0.27
(0.09) (0.12) (0.15)
Economic X Frequent −0.59∗∗ −0.67∗∗ −0.50∗∗
(0.10) (0.14) (0.16)
Moral X Frequent −0.52∗∗ −0.73∗∗ −0.33∗
(0.10) (0.15) (0.15)
(Intercept) 2.83∗∗ 2.75∗∗ 3.01∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13)
AIC 8487.77 4175.85 3516.07
BIC 8559.91 4239.40 3577.66
Log Likelihood -4231.89 -2075.92 -1746.03
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: Subject 1507 737 626
Num. groups: Issue 2 2 2
Var: Subject (Intercept) 0.52 0.52 0.48
Var: Issue (Intercept) 0.01 0.00 0.02
Var: Residual 0.57 0.58 0.57
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Public Secularism
Table 12: Effect of Public Secularism on Trust for Candidate
All Democrats Republicans
Public Secularism −0.29∗∗ −0.42∗∗ −0.05
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
Economic Treatment 0.04 −0.09 0.18∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Moral Treatment 0.23∗∗ 0.19∗ 0.29∗∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
Public Secularism X Economic 0.23∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.09
(0.07) (0.11) (0.12)
Public Secularism X Moral 0.27∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.12
(0.07) (0.11) (0.11)
(Intercept) 3.36∗∗ 3.45∗∗ 3.34∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
AIC 8538.12 4209.04 3525.10
BIC 8592.22 4256.70 3571.30
Log Likelihood -4260.06 -2095.52 -1753.55
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: Subject 1507 737 626
Num. groups: Issue 2 2 2
Var: Subject (Intercept) 0.53 0.54 0.49
Var: Issue (Intercept) 0.01 0.00 0.02
Var: Residual 0.58 0.59 0.58
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Religious and Moral Conviction
Table 13: Effect of Religious and Moral Conviction on Trust for Candidate
All Democrats Republicans
Religious Conviction (RC) 0.23∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.17∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Economic Treatment 0.64∗∗ 0.41∗ 0.91∗∗
(0.11) (0.17) (0.16)
Moral Treatment 0.65∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.79∗∗
(0.11) (0.16) (0.16)
Moral Conviction (MC) 0.03 −0.03 0.13∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Economic X RC −0.22∗∗ −0.22∗∗ −0.22∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Moral X RC −0.21∗∗ −0.28∗∗ −0.12∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Economic X MC 0.02 0.08 −0.05
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Moral X MC 0.07∗ 0.15∗∗ −0.05
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
(Intercept) 2.54∗∗ 2.57∗∗ 2.48∗∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.14)
AIC 8443.65 4164.17 3482.53
BIC 8515.78 4227.72 3544.12
Log Likelihood -4209.83 -2070.08 -1729.26
Num. obs. 3014 1474 1252
Num. groups: Subject 1507 737 626
Num. groups: Issue 2 2 2
Var: Subject (Intercept) 0.50 0.49 0.46
Var: Issue (Intercept) 0.01 0.00 0.01
Var: Residual 0.57 0.58 0.55
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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